Executive Summary

Yemen has been embroiled in an armed conflict for more than nine years, lacking agreement on a transitional political process or a legally-recognized authority encompassing the entire country. The nation also suffers from the absence of established legislation on transitional justice and lacks inherited experiences that could be relied upon to address reparations, uncover the truth, and confront the systemic denial of past human rights violations. Therefore, considering approaches to institutional reform presents a formidable challenge in a reality marked by uncertainty, the potential for renewed violence, and the continued perpetration of grave human rights abuses by conflicting parties, including enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary and unlawful detention, and torture, as well as cruel and degrading treatment.

This study, prepared by Mwatana for Human Rights in collaboration with a local expert, reflects the determination of Yemeni civil society to advance the discourse on institutional reform and contribute to establishing some foundational conditions for a post-conflict transitional justice process. The study analyzes the current institutional and legal environment in the justice and security sectors and identifies the structural, legal, and procedural deficiencies that have contributed to the perpetration of violations and the absence of accountability. It also examines the capacity of national justice and security institutions in the areas of investigation and prosecution, identifying the needs that must be met for these institutions to perform their duties efficiently and in a manner consistent with national law and international standards related to the administration of justice.

Methodology

The study is based on field data and case studies of severe human rights violations that occurred during the conflict period (2014–2024) at the hands of public officials, law enforcement agents, and non-state actors in the governorates of Sana’a, Aden, Al Hudaydah, Hadhramaut, Taiz, Marib, Abyan, Hajjah, Lahij, Dhamar, Shabwah, Al Bayda, and Amran. Research for the study focused on tracking the progress of complaints, evidence collection, investigations, and litigation related to these violations, the obstacles victims faced in accessing justice mechanisms, the responses of security and justice institutions (judicial enforcement officers, public prosecutors, and specialized courts) to victims' needs for justice, the challenges to the processes of redress, and the violations committed by security and judicial institutions through lack of adherence to legal and procedural requirements during arrest, detention, investigation, and trial. The research also explored how these institutions handled their duties related to prosecution and combating impunity.

The qualitative information for this study was collected using various methods, including reviewing records and information provided by victims, conducting supplementary individual interviews, analyzing field reports, and gathering data from local civil society. Additional information was obtained by reviewing relevant literature, analyzing the content of legal texts, and conducting focus group discussions.

The General State of Security and Justice Sector Institutions in the Context of the Conflict

The armed conflict in Yemen has led to an increase in political interference in judicial matters and intensified the influence exerted on judges and the administration of justice across the country. The unity of the legal and legislative system has been jeopardized due to the fragmentation of the higher judicial bodies along political lines, with some parties to the conflict unilaterally imposing changes to the law. This has resulted in the emergence of unlawful structures that have compromised judicial independence in certain areas.

At the local level, the conflict has complicated avenues for redress and access to justice. Courts and prosecution offices are divided among the conflicting parties according to their territorial control, leading to a significant breach of the principles of equality and non-discrimination in legal proceedings. This division has also deprived populations in areas controlled by opposing parties of access to justice. Judicial fragmentation has also reinforced impunity, allowing some perpetrators of human rights violations to find safe havens from prosecution by fleeing to areas controlled by other parties.

The wide territorial jurisdiction of Yemen’s specialized criminal courts and prosecutors exacerbates difficulties in accessing justice, as these institutions are limited to a few governorates, despite being the bodies authorized to handle many cases related to human rights violations. Victims face significant challenges in pursuing legal proceedings due to the difficulty in reaching courts, the large caseloads these courts handle, the irregular functioning of prosecution offices and courts, the long intervals between sessions, the lack of adequate facilities, and the shortage of judges and prosecutors.

The proliferation of judicial enforcement authorities, including unofficial entities and security supervisors affiliated with conflict parties, has created additional sources of abuse and procedural violations during arrest, detention, investigation, and evidence collection. These illegitimate judicial actors obstruct the enforcement of court and prosecution orders to release detainees or defendants, prevent certain cases from reaching the courts, interfere in the distribution of cases across courts, and hinder the execution of court rulings, all without effective oversight from the public prosecutor's office.

The police forces and security agencies have suffered from extensive administrative and functional interventions by the conflict parties. These parties have redirected the capacities and resources of these agencies toward their own internal security priorities, alongside newly formed and inexperienced unofficial entities that are organically linked to the conflict parties. The excessive influence of security and military agencies (both official and unofficial) over the public prosecutor's office and the courts is the biggest obstacle to the administration of justice during the conflict. The impact of these agencies extends beyond committing violations, as they actively work to obstruct victims' access to justice and derail the enforcement of the law. Often, these security agencies enjoy broad political cover from authorities in various regions, as unstable politicians rely on them for continued protection. This mutual support between politicians and security officials complicates access to redress and the administration of justice, systematically reinforcing impunity and enabling continued violations without fear of accountability. Notably, this mutual protection relationship extends to the Saudi/UAE-led Coalition, which provides broad immunity from accountability to security and military agencies suspected of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.

General Principles of Justice in Yemeni Legislation

A comprehensive review of Yemeni national legislation, particularly as it relates to the principles of justice and the criminalization and punishment of human rights violations, reveals significant and widespread legislative gaps. One of the key principles inadequately protected by constitutional and legal guarantees to ensure its effective implementation and minimize the impact of political fluctuations is the principle of judicial independence. The systemic weaknesses in Yemen's criminal justice system can largely be attributed to legal gaps related to this principle, such as the judiciary’s lack of autonomy in selecting judges and other important personnel based on competence, integrity, and independence. Additionally, there are insufficient safeguards to prevent interference in the judiciary's administrative and financial affairs. It is difficult to attribute the failure of this principle solely to errors in application and practice as long as these legal deficiencies persist.

Conversely, the failure to enforce existing, strong legal provisions is another factor contributing to the absence of criminal justice in Yemen. The constitution and other Yemeni laws contain many fundamental principles, judicial procedures, and guarantees of basic human rights and public freedoms. The challenge lies in the activation of these legal texts, which should remain amenable to practical application and open to revision and improvement.

One of the significant gaps in Yemeni legislation concerning justice and criminal accountability for human rights violations is the ambiguity and contradictions within the text of the law, which fails to fully encompass the principles of justice and the necessary legal protections. This lack of clarity, detail and comprehensiveness creates opportunities for wrongful practices to flourish. Although Yemeni legislation criminalizes actions recognized as serious human rights violations, it does not consistently treat all such crimes with the gravity they deserve. For instance, offenses like unlawful detention are not classified as serious crimes under Yemeni law, and the penalties prescribed for them do not reflect their severe criminal nature. This is particularly concerning because many grave crimes, such as enforced disappearance, torture, and even extrajudicial killing, often stem from this initial violation. Moreover, Yemeni law lacks precise legal definitions for various types of serious human rights violations, instead offering broad and generalized definitions for these crimes.

Yemeni law holds public officials criminally accountable for acts committed in the course of their duties and tends to impose harsher penalties when the perpetrator is a public official or law enforcement agent. However, vague and broad exceptions undermine this principle. If an act is associated with one or more of the recognized grounds for justification, it is stripped of its criminal nature, absolving the public official or equivalent from both criminal and civil liability. This has a detrimental impact on achieving criminal justice and on victims' rights to appropriate compensation, as the actions of public officials and law enforcement officers are often linked to these justifications (such as performing duties, exercising legal rights, or acting in self-defense). Additionally, Yemeni legislation does not adequately adhere to the principle of providing appropriate compensation for harm suffered by victims as result of crimes committed by  public officials and law enforcement personnel. This shortcoming prevents the achievement of the principle's primary purpose: to alleviate or remedy the harm suffered by victims without subjecting them to additional litigation.

The ambiguity and contradictions within legal texts necessitate legislative reforms to make those texts precise, bold, and clear. Crafting legal provisions with accuracy and resolving any ambiguity or conflicts, while applying adequate legal safeguards to the principles of justice and public rights, undoubtedly reduces the likelihood of misapplication or errors in practice when the law is implemented. Conversely, the absence of such clarity and safeguards increases the potential for such issues.

Procedural Rules for Redress, Prosecution, and Administration of Justice in Yemeni Legislation

First: Police and Judicial Enforcement Agency Procedures in Investigation and Evidence Collection

The Yemeni procedural system exhibits significant weaknesses and shortcomings in facilitating redress and access to justice during the investigation and evidence-gathering stages. Notably, the procedural rules fail to provide the Public Prosecution with effective mechanisms to ensure the legality and integrity of investigations and preliminary inquiries conducted by the police and other judicial enforcement agencies, particularly in the case of serious human rights violations allegedly committed by public officials and law enforcement personnel. The reliability of the Public Prosecution's investigations depends heavily on the accuracy and correctness of the investigations and evidence collection reports provided by judicial enforcement officers.

The Yemeni procedural system lacks accountability mechanisms to ensure that complaints and reports submitted to judicial officers are acted upon and included in formal records. There is no guarantee that judicial officers will immediately proceed to the scene to gather evidence, prevent its loss, or protect the crime scene from tampering. Moreover, the system fails to ensure the preservation of evidence, material traces, and seized items in their original condition. It also lacks procedures to ensure that suspects are located and arrested in a legally compliant manner and that they are not classified as fugitives or unidentified unless proper, timely investigations are conducted. Additionally, there are no mechanisms in place to verify that judicial officers have accurately recorded all findings in their evidence collection reports, nor are they required to promptly submit these reports to the Public Prosecution after signing them and ensuring their legal completeness. This step is crucial for the Public Prosecution to be able to process and investigate cases lawfully and effectively.

Additionally, the procedural rules governing arrest and custody are generally broad and do not sufficiently restrict the powers of judicial enforcement officers. Arrests without a warrant, when carried out by these officers, are not subject to a clear chain of command, making it difficult to pinpoint responsibility for unlawful arrests. Yemeni law does not mandate specific procedures for the arrest of juveniles and women nor does it contain the necessary legal protections to shield these groups from arbitrary and unlawful arrest. There are no procedural requirements mandating that police officers and judicial enforcement officers submit immediate reports to the relevant authorities explaining their use of force during an arrest and the exceptional circumstances that justified such actions.

The procedural rules for prisons also fail to define the types of violations that warrant disciplinary action against prisoners, leaving prisoners vulnerable to such penalties without cause. Moreover, in the event of a prisoner's death or illness, there are no effective mechanisms to ensure prompt notification of the appropriate authorities and the prisoner's family.

Second: Procedures of the Public Prosecution in Deciding on Charges and Initiating Criminal Proceedings

The Yemeni procedural system mandates that prosecutors accept complaints lodged against government employees or officials for actions committed during the performance of their duties or due to their official capacity. The prosecutor is required to promptly hear the complainant's statement and those of any witnesses upon receiving the complaint or becoming aware of it, as the prosecution typically initiates investigations into criminal cases without requiring a formal complaint. However, the procedural rules concerning complaints against public officials grant the chief prosecutor sole authority to determine the seriousness of the complaint and decide whether to proceed, without any judicial oversight or review process. The investigator is also empowered to legally classify and describe the charges, a decision that influences all subsequent actions by the Public Prosecution and potentially impacts how courts will consider the criminal case.

Yemeni procedural law grants the Public Prosecution significant discretionary power in determining the outcome of justice, despite concerns about the independence of the prosecution. The Public Prosecution has the authority to issue a final dismissal of charges based on preliminary investigation reports if the crime is linked to one or more of the justifications that legally exonerate the actions of public officials. This decision effectively halts any further investigation into the charges. While the Yemeni criminal justice system allows the victim to appeal and challenge this decision, the appeal must be filed within ten days of the date of notification—a timeframe that is insufficient for the victim to adequately prepare their case.

Members of the Public Prosecution personally conduct investigations into allegations against military and police officers, as well as judicial enforcement officers, and also investigate incidents that occur in detention facilities. The prosecution has the authority to detain public officials as part of the investigation, and must immediately notify the official’s department upon issuing an arrest or detention order. Additionally, the prosecution may request any government agency to provide documents and records necessary to uncover the truth, and may visit the location to review the documents if they cannot be transferred.

However, there is no specific procedure for investigating serious human rights violations allegedly committed by public employees, officials, or law enforcement personnel. There is also no requirement that investigations be conducted immediately and swiftly, nor that the suspect be suspended from official duties during the investigation.

The authority to make decisions regarding serious crimes after an investigation has been conducted lies solely with the chief prosecutors, rather than being distributed among prosecution members and investigative judges to ensure procedural integrity. The prosecution may decide to issue a  "no case to answer" ruling due to insufficient evidence, inability to identify the perpetrator, or lack of significance attributed to the case. Furthermore, the Public Prosecution has the right to issue a decision not to proceed with criminal charges against a public official if it determines that the official should be subject to disciplinary, military, or administrative penalties instead.

If the chief appellate prosecutor decides to pursue the case, an indictment is issued to refer the criminal case to the competent court. The Public Prosecution can refer fugitives from justice for trial, but cannot refer unidentified fugitives to the courts. While Yemeni law ensures that the Public Prosecution can initiate and conduct investigations against public officials and judicial enforcement officers, prosecuting them in the competent court requires authorization from the Attorney General or, in the case of judges, approval from the Supreme Judicial Council.

Observation of the procedural rules governing the handling of cases after investigation reveal that the prosecution's decision to dismiss charges for crimes committed by public officials and law enforcement officers often stems from illogical justifications. These justifications, such as determining that the case should be subject to administrative penalties or dismissing the case as insignificant, can lead to impunity, failing to distinguish between serious and non-serious offenses.

Third: Court Procedures

The Yemeni procedural system imposes restrictions on the authority of the competent court to alter the legal classification of charges presented by the Public Prosecution. The court is not allowed to independently adjudicate a crime that was not included in the indictment submitted by the prosecution, nor can it change the foundation of the case by adding new facts not mentioned in the indictment or attributing facts to individuals whose names were not included in the indictment, even if their names appeared in evidence-gathering reports or the prosecution's investigations. This restriction on the court's authority negatively impacts the pursuit of justice and inhibits the comprehensive revelation of the truth surrounding violations, including all involved parties. As a result, the prosecution, through the boundaries it sets for the case and the legal characterization it assigns to the crime in the indictment, effectively plays the decisive role in determining the course of justice, rather than the competent court.

In cases where the accused is a fugitive from justice, the court appoints a representative on their behalf and proceeds with the trial as if it were held in the accused's presence. The court is also empowered to order the seizure of the fugitive's assets to prevent them from being disposed of, although in practice, there is little evidence to suggest that this occurs.

Although the Yemeni procedural system upholds the principle of continuous trials through successive sessions, it provides excessively wide grounds for postponing, suspending, and interrupting proceedings in ways that undermine the principle of timely trials. The system also specifies a broad range of incidental matters that the court must first resolve before it can address the actual case, neglecting to establish reasonable timeframes for the various stages and procedures of the trial.

Key Recommendations

Regarding Legislative Reforms

Post-Conflict Constitution Building: Ensure that post-conflict constitution-building includes the main principles and foundations of criminal justice based on the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the separation of powers. This process must ensure the establishment of a genuinely independent national judiciary, which includes prohibiting any interference by the executive branch in the affairs of judicial bodies. It should also involve revoking the Minister of Justice's authority over the financial and administrative affairs of courts and public prosecutions. Additionally, the admission policy for the High Judicial Institute must be scrutinized to align with legal standards and promote national inclusivity without resorting to sectarian quotas. Judges and prosecutors should be appointed based on merit and integrity, and the Supreme Judicial Council should be formed through elections by a general assembly comprising judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and law professors from Yemeni universities. Furthermore, sufficient legal guarantees must be provided to ensure the independence of the Public Prosecution from the executive branch and to minimize the influence of the latter.

Human Rights Violations: Introduce a constitutional provision that explicitly prohibits all human rights violations under any circumstances, including exceptional situations and periods of political instability.

Reorganization of Criminal Courts: Reform the criminal court system through legislation by restricting its jurisdiction to state security cases, providing adequate legal safeguards to ensure the proper administration of justice in its procedures and rulings, and protecting the rights of victims, witnesses, and experts.

Specialized Human Rights Courts: Establish specialized public prosecutions and courts dedicated to investigating and adjudicating human rights violations. These bodies should have jurisdiction over all violations committed by public officials, law enforcement personnel, and individuals affiliated with non-state actors.

International Human Rights Instruments: Ratify international human rights treaties and instruments approved by previous governments and bring human rights issues under the jurisdiction of national courts. The judiciary should comply with international human rights law and humanitarian law standards and be guided by best practices in facilitating access to justice and prosecuting perpetrators.

Precise Definitions of Human Rights Violations: Develop precise definitions of serious human rights violations based on the nature of the criminal act. These definitions should encompass, without exception, all crimes classified as such under international treaties and conventions, including crimes related to detention and deprivation of liberty in any form.

Distinction Between Human Rights Violations and Other Crimes: Differentiate between serious violations of fundamental human rights and other criminal acts. Rules concerning statutes of limitations, the right to file lawsuits, the principle of non bis in idem (no double jeopardy), and the prohibition of retroactive application should not apply to serious violations of fundamental human rights.

Mandatory Compensation for Victims: Amend the Criminal Procedure Code to require courts to include in their criminal convictions a mandate for the perpetrator to pay compensation to the victim that appropriately reflects the material and moral harm caused by the crime.

Clarification of Law Enforcement Powers: Establish clear legal boundaries for the jurisdiction and powers of judicial enforcement officers to ensure effective accountability. The supervisory and oversight role of the Public Prosecution—beyond just the Attorney General—over the actions and potential abuses of these officers should be strengthened. Additionally, judicial enforcement officers should be administratively subordinate to the Public Prosecution in their investigative and evidence-gathering activities in criminal cases.

Witness Protection and Statements Obtained Under Duress: Address legislative gaps related to the protection of witnesses from intimidation or harm, and explicitly invalidate any statements obtained through torture, ensuring that this invalidity extends to all subsequent legal proceedings.

Court Authority to Reclassify Charges: Grant courts the authority to modify the legal classification of crimes in the indictment submitted by the Public Prosecution, including through the addition of new facts or individuals to the charges. This would enable the judicial process to achieve its intended outcomes, by empowering the judge to intervene where necessary to uncover the truth and deliver proper justice.

Amending Inconsistent Legal Provisions: Amend legal provisions that are inconsistent with the constitution and other legal texts, such as Article 38 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which contradicts the principle of non-prescription for serious crimes as established in the constitution.

Reform of Police Law: Amend the current Police Authority Law by incorporating specific provisions from Law No. (24) of 1991 regarding the duties and powers of the police.

Institutional Measures and Strategies for Non-Recurrence

Comprehensive Post-Conflict Review: Following the end of the conflict, undertake a comprehensive review process to assess judicial and prosecutorial appointments made by all parties involved in the conflict across the country. Appointees’ files should be examined to verify their credentials and qualifications according to standards set by an independent national body established for this purpose. This body should also be empowered to address grievances related to judicial transfers, promotions, and other related issues. Additionally, it should review the legality of judicial and administrative directives issued by the Public Prosecution, the Ministry of Justice, and the Judicial Inspection Authority during the conflict.

Establishing an Independent National Preventive Mechanism: Establish an independent national preventive mechanism to protect individuals deprived of their liberty from torture and other forms of cruel and degrading treatment. This mechanism should have access to comprehensive databases on prisoners and be granted the right to direct communication with them. It should also take necessary protective measures, including undertaking regular prison visits, conducting interviews with prisoners, and addressing reports of torture or mistreatment.

Restructuring Security Institutions: Restructure security institutions that systematically violated human rights during the conflict or became notorious for repeated violations of legal procedures. This includes changing their names, leadership, operational rules, and governance to eliminate the institutional and organizational factors that led to or facilitated these violations. The restructuring should also aim to restore public trust in these institutions as reliable public entities.

Creating Employee Records in Security and Justice Sectors: Create special records for employees in the police, armed forces, and all other justice and security institutions. These records should contain comprehensive data on employees, their professional conduct, and any disciplinary actions taken against them, to help in assessing their suitability for public service.

Exclusion of Certain Security Officials: Undertake vetting of employee records after the conflict and exclude security and military officials from official positions if there are reasonable grounds to believe they were involved in human rights violations, issued orders leading to such violations, or neglected to act within their legal responsibilities to prevent such violations. This should also apply to security sector personnel known for their unethical professional behavior and their tendency to disregard the law during the conflict, particularly where there is a likelihood they were involved in acts of torture, killing, or enforced disappearances that are difficult to legally prove.

Governance and Oversight of the Security Sector: Strengthen governance, oversight, and accountability mechanisms within the security sector, incorporating respect for human rights as a criterion for the promotion of police officers and public prosecutors.

Digitalization and Automation of Legal Processes: Update, digitize, and automate legal procedures and documents, starting from arrest orders, evidence collection, records, attachments, and documents, through to release or referral. This should include the public prosecution's and courts' operations, creating a fully electronic case documentation and data system to facilitate prosecutors' and judges' work, accelerate proceedings, and expedite case resolutions.

Gradual and Secure Disbanding of Non-Official Security Forces: Implement a gradual and secure disbanding of non-official security forces and demobilize or reintegrate their personnel into corresponding official structures in a manner consistent with the principles of justice and guarantees of non-recurrence of previous violations. This process should be part of a broader strategic vision for institutional reform and post-conflict transitional justice, which should include reviewing employment standards in public institutions.

Promotion of Human Rights Culture: Promote human rights awareness among police and security sector personnel, emphasizing procedures that ensure respect for the rights and needs of victims in the performance of their duties, particularly considering the needs of vulnerable groups such as women and children.

Internal Oversight and Disciplinary Measures: Strengthen internal oversight mechanisms, accountability measures, and disciplinary actions within security and justice sector institutions.

Victims' Rights Awareness Programs: Organize targeted awareness programs to educate victims about their rights to access justice mechanisms, including understanding the competencies of justice bodies, their procedures, and how to access them.

National Mechanisms for Torture Monitoring: Establish national mechanisms for the systematic monitoring of all cases of torture, along with a national fund to provide legal and financial assistance to victims of human rights violations.

Adequate Resource Allocation: Allocate sufficient resources to ensure that justice-related agencies can effectively carry out their legal duties.

Prompt Payment of Salaries Post-Conflict: Immediately after the conflict, ensure the prompt payment of overdue salaries to judges, their assistants, prosecutors, and all employees in the security and justice sectors. Their financial and employment conditions should be addressed, including issues related to incentives, bonuses, and promotions.

Procedural Rules

Regulating the Detention Process: Establish strict controls over detention procedures, limiting the power to summon, arrest, and detain individuals to the police, while minimizing the exceptions to this rule as much as possible. Police powers in matters of arrest and detention should be further restricted by requiring subsequent actions such as the prompt submission of reports to the Public Prosecution immediately after the arrest or detention occurs. Detention procedures should be subject to review by the Public Prosecution, with regular reassessments of the need for continued detention.

Streamlining Complaint and Grievance Mechanisms: Simplify the process for submitting complaints and grievances to the Public Prosecution and strengthen rapid response mechanisms to address them effectively.

Expedited Referral of Evidence Collection Reports: Mandate that judicial enforcement officers quickly forward evidence collection reports to the Public Prosecution without delay in cases involving human rights violations.

Searching for Illegal Detention Centers: Require the Public Prosecution to proactively search for illegal detention centers, and render it responsible for opening investigations and pursuing legal actions against those responsible for illegal detention, instead of merely releasing detainees or transferring them to legal facilities.

Independent Oversight of Detention Facilities: Ensure that the Public Prosecution exercises genuine, effective, and independent oversight over all detention facilities without exception.

Suspension of Suspected Public Officials: Suspend public officials suspected of committing human rights violations from their official duties while they are under investigation and trial.

Direct Prosecution of Human Rights Violations: Grant the Public Prosecution the authority to directly prosecute cases of human rights violations committed by judicial enforcement officers, public officials, and prosecutors without prior permission, with the obligation only to notify the relevant entity of the charges and actions taken against their staff member/s.

Prohibition of Case Closure for Unknown Perpetrators: Prohibit the closure of cases involving serious human rights violations due to the inability to identify the perpetrator through evidence collection reports.

Legal Sanctions for Non-Compliance: Prohibit individuals who refuse to present themselves before the Public Prosecution or the courts from accessing certain civil rights, such as conducting financial transactions or obtaining official documents. Additionally, enforce the seizure of their assets.

Limiting Justifications for Legal Immunity: Ensure that the justifications for exoneration associated with crimes committed by public officials or law enforcement personnel do not preclude prosecution and conviction. The effect of such justifications should be limited to reducing the sentence, not exempting the individual from accountability.

Recommendations to the International Community

Reevaluate UN Standards on Transitional Justice Support: Reconsider certain United Nations standards related to supporting transitional justice worldwide, particularly the standard of withholding assistance from courts that permit the death penalty. This is especially relevant in post-conflict countries that urgently need support to rebuild the justice sector and establish peace.

Promote Specialized Legal Studies: Encourage the production of specialized legal studies on criminal justice in Yemen and the legal remedies provided by the Yemeni criminal procedure system for vulnerable groups (children, women, individuals with special needs, and marginalized groups) and assess the gaps and effectiveness of these remedies in achieving justice for victims of human rights violations.

Research Informal Remedies in Local Contexts: Conduct in-depth studies on the role of informal (customary) remedies in local Yemeni communities, analyzing the strengths, weaknesses and potential contribution of these remedies to achieving transitional justice at the national level while conforming with international standards.

Support Civil Society Institutions: Provide support to civil society organizations dedicated to legal awareness and the promotion of judicial independence.

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