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When asked about the impacts that warring party attacks and other conduct have had on their lives, people across Yemen described dire effects on food sources, water sources and critical civilian infrastructure.
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Executive summary:
In Yemen, parties to the conflict have deprived civilians of objects that are essential to their survival (OIS), starving them, in some cases to death.
When asked about the impacts that warring party attacks and other conduct have had on their lives, people across Yemen described dire effects on food sources, water sources and critical civilian infrastructure. After the Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led coalition started bombing artisanal fishermen in the waters off Al-Hudaydah, one woman said her “son was no longer able to go fishing.” They “decided to flee,” fearing [they] would either die from starvation or that [a Saudi/UAE-led coalition] aircraft would kill [them].”[1] The sea “meant everything for the community”[2] but had become a place of fear. Some fishermen had no choice but to return to fishing, “because [they] have no other source of food or income.”[3] Similarly, in Dhubab District in Taiz governate, a man talked about how the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group (Ansar Allah) had laid landmines everywhere, with “no signs or maps showing their whereabouts,” becoming “a threat to all of [them].”[4] Residents of areas in which landmines had been planted by Ansar Allah said that they had not “suffer[ed] from starvation or water scarcity before the mines were planted, and [their] livelihood was fine,” but because of the landmines, they “stopped herding, logging, and agriculture, and [their] water has been cut off.”[5]
Following a year-long investigation, and several years of research and documentation across Yemen, this Mwatana for Human Rights (Mwatana) and Global Rights Compliance (GRC) report documents conduct of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition—acting with the consent of the internationally recognized Government of Yemen and fighting with the Yemeni military—and Ansar Allah that has likely violated prohibitions under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international humanitarian law (IHRL).
In Part G, we document airstrikes by the Saudi/UAE-led coalition on farms in Abs District in Hajjah Governate, on water facilities in the Sahar and Kitaf wa Al Buqa’a districts in Saada Governate, and on artisanal fishing boats and equipment in Alluheyah District in Al-Hudaydah Governate. The attacks destroyed, damaged and/or rendered useless OIS, namely agricultural areas, irrigation works, livestock, foodstuffs, water infrastructure, fishing boats and fishing equipment. Airstrikes on fishermen, in particular, instilled fear in the fishing population, preventing them from fishing at their pre-existing capacity.
In Part H, we document Ansar Allah-imposed restrictions on humanitarian relief actions in Saada Governate and their widespread use of landmines in Taiz Governate. Restrictions on humanitarian organizations’ operations and the diversion and redirection of humanitarian aid to Ansar Allah-loyalists constituted effective refusals to consent to humanitarian relief action and to allow and facilitate the passage of impartial relief action; restrictions were so severe that they forced the World Food Programme (WFP) to suspend its operations in 2019 and again in 2020. Ansar Allah actions deprived civilians of indispensable aid, including food. Ansar Allah’s widespread and indiscriminate use of landmines in wholly civilian areas, including in the Al-Omari area of Dhubab District, Taiz Governate, constituted attacks on grazing and agricultural areas (OIS) that damaged, destroyed or otherwise rendered the areas useless. The widespread and indiscriminate use of landmines in the area, which have injured and killed some shepherds and their livestock, has instilled fear in the farming population, preventing them from accessing agricultural land.
Mwatana and GRC conclude that members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah used starvation as a method of warfare. Their conduct severely impeded civilians’ access to food and water, and they acted in spite of the widespread knowledge of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen, where people, including children, were dying from starvation. Members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah were aware of the virtual certainty that, following their conduct, starvation would occur in the ordinary course of events—that is, without humanitarian intervention—or intended to use starvation as a method of warfare.
Further investigation with a view to mapping and identifying those responsible for the use of starvation as a method of warfare, as well as other crimes committed in the context of the conflict in Yemen, is required to determine the identity of the perpetrators and the mode/s of liability under which they may be held responsible.
1. Parties to the conflict in Yemen committed starvation as a war crime
This report focuses on the use of starvation as a war crime in the conflict in Yemen. We analyse the conduct of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah in the context of the IHL prohibition and the corollary war crime.
IHL prohibits the use of starvation as a method of warfare. Article 14 of AP II prohibits the use of “starvation as a method of warfare” in non-international armed conflicts, stating that “[it] is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, [OIS], such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”
Using starvation as a method of warfare is a war crime. As recognized by Article 8(2)(e)(xix) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in addition to the conduct Article 14 of AP II prohibits, wilfully impeding relief supplies may also constitute the war crime of starvation. Although the ICC does not currently have jurisdiction over the parties to the conflict in Yemen, the definition under the Rome Statute is nevertheless relevant. It provides the most recent and comprehensive articulation of the crime of starvation. Any future domestic proceedings based on universal jurisdiction are likely to rely on the Rome Statute (see Part F, Section 2).
After finding that the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah intentionally (Part G, Section 5.2.2.2 and Part H, Sections 2.4.1.3(ii) and 3.2.2.2(ii)), and unlawfully (Part F, Sections 1.2.2 and 2.2.1; Part G, Section 5.2.1; and Part H, Sections 2.4.1.2 and 3.2.2.1), deprived civilians of objects which constituted OIS, and that Ansar Allah wilfully impeded relief supplies, we examine whether members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah may have intended to starve civilians or whether they had knowledge of the virtual certainty that starvation would result from their actions in the ordinary course of events (that is, without intervention); the defining mens rea element of the crime under Article 30 of the Rome Statute.
The report assesses a range of indicators of intent relevant to determining whether starvation as a war crime was committed. Indications of intent in conflict are rarely overt, particularly with respect to crimes that require specific intent, like starvation. Instead, indirect or circumstantial evidence from which intent can be inferred is often necessary to determine what was in the minds of the perpetrator/s when they decided on, ordered, or otherwise assisted or participated in the conduct documented. It is also difficult, although not impossible, to establish that a single attack on OIS or restriction of access to OIS was carried out with intent to starve civilians. Bearing this in mind, the pattern of conduct—relied upon in numerous criminal trials in which war crimes have been prosecuted—and the context surrounding the attacks becomes vital to understanding why individuals acted as they did.
Food insecurity is not incidental to the conflict in Yemen—the conflict, and the conduct of the warring parties, drives it. When the conflict began in 2014, approximately 41% of the population in Yemen was food insecure (see Part E, Section 2.1). According to the WFP and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OHCA), the percentage of the population that is food insecure has increased almost every year since 2014. In early 2021, WFP reported that Yemen was “headed straight toward the biggest famine in modern history,” with “over 400,000 children at risk of dying” and 16.2 million people facing acute food insecurity (see Part E, Section 2.2).
OCHA reported that 66% of people needing support to treat or prevent malnutrition in 2021 are women and, of the 4.7 million people requiring treatment for acute malnutrition in 2021, 1.2 million are pregnant and lactating women (see Part E, Section 4).
Chronic food insecurity and the risk of famine have been particularly acute in the Hajjah, Saada, Al-Hudaydah and Taiz Governates, wherein the starvation-related conduct documented in this report occurred. These governates have been classified by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification as Phase 3 (crisis) or Phase 4 (emergency) throughout the conflict, with pockets of them at various times projected to be in Phase 5 (famine) (See Part C and Part E, Section 2.2).
While the number of people who have been killed during the conflict in Yemen vary by source, OCHA estimated that the conflict has directly and indirectly caused 233,000 deaths (including of persons directly participating in hostilities), with more than half—131,000 deaths—resulting “from indirect causes such as a lack of food, health services and infrastructure.”
Members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah must have known of the dire humanitarian situation. They very likely had knowledge that segments of the civilian population were entirely reliant on access to specific agricultural produce and livestock, artisanal fishing and water infrastructure, and that the destruction of such objects and restrictions on humanitarian access would mean these civilians would be unable to access affordable food and clean water. Humanitarian organizations, as well as UN bodies such as the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen (GEE) and the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen (PoE), engaged directly with parties to the conflict and reported on food and water security-related issues, and advocated for humanitarian access to ameliorate the devastating impacts the war was having on the civilian population. The Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni government and Ansar Allah must also have known that the conduct of other parties to the conflict was exacerbating food insecurity throughout the areas in which hostilities occurred.
The manner, timing and repetition of attacks on OIS and the restrictions on humanitarian access that were documented in this report, particularly in the context of the broader pattern of attacks on OIS, support a finding of intent.
With respect to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the airstrikes documented formed part of a pattern of repetitive attacks on similar OIS, e.g. on farms, water facilities and artisanal fishing boats and equipment, and on other types of OIS, including food markets, means of transporting food and water, and food and water storage and production facilities. Saudi/UAE-led coalition attacks on OIS have been documented by Mwatana, the GEE, the PoE and other groups. In the attacks on the water facilities documented in this report, multiple airstrikes were carried out on each facility, some of which occurred immediately after the facilities had been built or repaired.
Ansar Allah’s obstruction of humanitarian access—including arresting and intimidating humanitarian workers, blocking aid convoys and illegally seizing the property of humanitarian organizations and workers—have been widely reported on in Saada Governate and elsewhere by the GEE, the PoE, WFP, OCHA and others. As noted above, the impediments were so severe WFP suspended humanitarian operations in Ansar Allah-controlled areas in 2019, impacting an estimated 850,000 beneficiaries, and again in 2020. The GEE, Mwatana, and others have also reported on the widespread and repeated use of landmines in civilian areas by Ansar Allah, without any precautions to minimize their indiscriminate effects, in violation of IHL.
Other factors driving food insecurity can be attributed to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni Government, and Ansar Allah, supporting a finding of intent.
The Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni government, and Ansar Allah-imposed targeted restrictive economic policies, which—in the context of a population vulnerable to fluctuations in the value of the Yemeni riyal and to disruptions to the supply chain—adversely impacted purchasing power, and consequently, access to food and water. These include the movement of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) from Sana’a to Aden by the Yemeni Government in 2016, followed by their withholding of salaries of hundreds of thousands of civil servants, and Ansar Allah’s banning of new bills issued by the CBY in Aden, diversion of 50 billion Yemeni riyals from the CBY in March 2020, withholding of salaries, imposition of heavy taxes (some of which were funnelled to support the war effort) and other tariffs in territories under their control, including on direly needed fuel. These are just a few examples of a wide array of restrictive policies.
Since 2015, the Saudi/UAE-led coalition has also imposed a de facto naval and aerial blockade on Yemen’s sea and airports, which—with varying levels of intensity throughout the conflict—has severely restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medicine to civilians. The Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Yemeni government’s decision to keep Sana’a international airport closed to commercial flights since 2016 “has precluded thousands of civilians from accessing necessary life-saving health care and treatment,” according to the GEE, which consequently found that the Government of Yemen violated the right to food and water.
Ansar Allah has also used siege-like warfare in Yemen, which has had a particularly acute impact on Taiz, where they confiscated food and medicine critical for meeting civilian’s survival needs and impeded civilian’s movement into and out of the city. Ansar Allah has also taken direct actions that have impacted civilians’ food security, including shelling areas affecting access to food and laying mines inside the Red Sea Mills in Al-Hudaydah, which previously contained enough wheat to feed 3.7 million people for one month; a quarter of WFP’s in-country stock.
Warring parties’ adherence, or non-adherence, to norms and prohibitions of IHL and IHRL can provide a window into the minds of their members. According to reports by the GEE, the PoE, Mwatana and numerous international and non-governmental organizations, the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah have committed other serious violations of IHL and violations and abuses of IHRL—beyond those outlined above—in connection with the conflict, which may constitute war crimes.
The Saudi/UAE-led coalition has attacked, destroyed and damaged other critical infrastructure, some of which may also constitute OIS in the Yemen context, including food storage sites, oil and gas, roads and bridges, electricity supplies and markets, and health facilities, which are necessary to access life-saving treatment, including to prevent wasting and death from malnutrition.
Ansar Allah has also indiscriminately shelled areas affecting access to food with a particular acute impact on Taiz, including those seeking food or safety.
Numerous other violations, including unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, sexual and gender-based violence, and the recruitment and use of children and other violations against children have also been committed by parties to the conflict.
Although further criminal investigation is required to identify the perpetrator/s and their mode/s of liability, this report ultimately concludes that it is possible to find, based on the above factors, that members of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah were aware of the virtual certainty that starvation would occur in the ordinary course of events, that is, without humanitarian intervention, or intended to use starvation as a method of warfare. (see Part G, Section 5.2 and Part H, Sections 2.4.1 and 3.4.2).
2. Other violations of IHL and violations or abuses of IHRL, which may constitute war crimes
Through the conduct documented in the report, the Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah, as well as the Yemeni Government, violated their obligations to respect, and in some cases protect and fulfill, the rights to food and water, as well as the rights to life, work, health and property (see Part. F, Section 3; Part G, Section 5.3.2; Part H, Sections 2.4.2, 3.4.3.2 and 3.4.4).
In addition to starvation, the conduct documented in this report may violate Article 13 of AP II and customary IHL and constitute other war crimes, in particular attacks on civilians and civilian objects and terrorizing the civilian population. Ansar Allah’s restrictions on humanitarian access also violate Article 18 of AP II and customary IHL, which require parties to a conflict to consent to, and allow and facilitate, impartial humanitarian relief actions carried out without adverse distinction. For further discussion, see Part F, Sections 2.3 and 2.4; Part G, Section 5.3.1; and Part H, Section 3.4.3.1.
3. Limited steps have been taken to prevent further international crimes and ensure accountability for Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah conduct
To date, steps taken at the international and domestic levels have had little impact in holding the perpetrators of international crimes accountable and ensuring reparations for civilian victims. Much more must be done to ensure accountability and redress.
The avenues for accountability and redress on the domestic level, to date, have not, and are unlikely to, meet the standards applicable to investigations and prosecutions under international law (see Part I, Section 1.3). The domestic criminal justice systems in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (as well as Iran) are unable to provide an effective remedy, either because they do not penalize the use of starvation as a method of warfare or do not ensure criminal proceedings are compliant with international law and standards governing the right to a fair trial and victims’ right to participate meaningfully in proceedings. Even if they could dispense effective justice, such States are unwilling or unable to hold perpetrators of starvation-related conduct liable (see Part I, Section 1.1).
The Yemeni National Commission of Inquiry, activated in 2015 to “investigate all alleged violations of human rights and [IHL] that have taken place since 2011 and to identify the perpetrators,” has faced significant challenges associated with its lack of structural independence, including because NCI commissioners are appointed by and report to the coalition-backed internationally recognized Yemeni Government. The NCI has also faced significant obstacles to carrying out its documentation mandate, and completed investigations have not resulted in the prosecution of alleged perpetrators (see Part I, Section 1.2).
The Saudi/UAE-led coalition’s Joint Incidents Assessment Team lacks the transparency, independence and impartiality necessary of an investigative mechanism.
At the international level, options for holding perpetrators accountable for starvation-related conduct appear to be more viable, but mechanisms which currently exist have not yet resulted in effective remedies for victims.
The GEE, in particular, has reported extensively on the conduct of the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the Yemeni government, Ansar Allah, and other warring parties, and has laid the groundwork for future accountability mechanisms. However, it is not mandated to collect and preserve evidence for criminal prosecutions per se, nor can it prepare case files for prosecution (see Part I, Section 2.2). The GEE itself recommends the adoption of some of the measures we recommend, set out below and in Part J.
Targeted sanctions, both by the UNSC and at the domestic level, have only thus far been imposed on Ansar Allah (see Part I, Section 2.3).
The ICC currently only has jurisdiction over persons involved in the conflict who are nationals of a state party to the ICC—such as nationals of state parties to the ICC who have provided assistance to the coalition, or nationals of one of the members of the coalition, like Jordan, who are state parties to the ICC. Communications submitted to the ICC in relation to such states parties, including by Mwatana, have yet to result in the opening of an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor (See Part I, Section 2.4). The ICC could exercise jurisdiction over Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Yemen and Ansar Allah if the UN Security Council referred the situation in Yemen to the Court, or if Yemen joined the Court or made a declaration accepting the court’s jurisdiction.
As states like Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not ratified the relevant protocols, treaty bodies, such as the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee, are not able to receive individual complaints regarding non-compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on Yemen (see Part I, Section 2.1).
To fill ongoing gaps in accountability, non-government organizations, including Mwatana, have sought to institute criminal proceedings in Italy for complicity, targeting Italian arms manufacturers, or administrative proceedings in the United Kingdom (UK), seeking to prevent the UK government’s licensing of arms sales. Such proceedings are ongoing (See Part I, Section 3).
Given the considerable gaps in the measures currently available at the domestic and international levels, significantly more needs to be done by the warring parties, by the internationally recognised Government of Yemen, by the UN Security Council, by the UN Human Rights Council, and by States to ensure accountability for international crimes and reparations for victims.
4. What should States do to prevent and ensure accountability for Saudi/UAE-led coalition and Ansar Allah conduct?[6]
In Part J of the report, we set out a comprehensive range of recommendations directed at parties to the conflict, other states and UN actors aimed at preventing further violations of IHL, violations and abuses of IHRL, and war crimes, holding perpetrators accountable, ensuring reparations for victims, and strengthening the institutional and normative architecture by which states and UN actors can do so. A selection of the core, most urgent, recommendations is set out below.
We call on all parties to the conflict to cease all violations of IHL, violations and abuses of IHRL and war crimes and to take steps to protect civilians and civilian objects, including OIS, and facilitate access to full humanitarian aid, including food and water. Additionally, parties to the conflict should (amongst other things):
The internationally recognized Government of Yemen, in particular, should:
With a view to preventing and ensuring accountability for starvation-related conduct and other criminal conduct committed during the conflict in Yemen, as well as violations and abuses of IHL and IHRL, we call on the UNSC, the UN Human Rights Council and states to urge parties to the conflict to cease committing violations of IHL and violations and abuses of IHRL, and proactively and decisively take the steps set out below.
UN Security Council
To facilitate a range of preventative and accountability-oriented tools available under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2417, as well as other relevant UNSC resolutions (see Part J, Section 5), the UNSC should:
UN Human Rights Council
To ensure justice and redress for violations and abuses of IHL and IHRL, as well as contribute to accountability for international crimes, at the 48th regular session in 2021, the UN Human Rights Council (UN HRC) should:
States
To combat food insecurity and famine, prevent further violations and abuses of IHL and IHRL and secure justice and redress for victims, States, where appropriate, should:
The US, UK and France in particular, should:
Iran
Immediately cease the transfer of weapons and the provision of logistical Support and other military support to the Ansar Allah armed group (Houthi)
[1] Mwatana for Human Rights interview with Aisha Ahmed on January 11, 2020.
[2] Mwatana for Human Rights interview with Ahmed Ali on January 10, 2020.
[3] Mwatana for Human Rights interview with Abdullah Alaallah on December 16, 2020.
[4] Mwatana for Human Rights interview with Waheed Zaid on October 15, 2019
[5] Mwatana for Human Rights interview with Saleh Ahmed on December 22, 2020.
[6] For a full list of recommendations, see Part J.
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