Death Falling from the Sky

Twenty years after the US began its secret and unaccountable killings in Yemen, the Biden Administration should, at long last, change towards a rights-respecting course.

Tuesday, March 23, 2021
Death Falling from the Sky
مصغر التقرير انجليزي

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Civilian Harm from the United States’ Use of Lethal Force in Yemen

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February 23, 2021

Executive Summary

Is it possible that the United States killed my son? What crime did he commit to be killed in this manner?

—A mother after a 2018 strike in Al Bayda governorate killed her sonThe United States has been using lethal force in Yemen for nearly two decades.Regardless of which president or party controlled the White House, the United States has never fully investigated the civilian cost of its operations in Yemen, has never taken sufficient steps to review the efficacy of these operations, and has never provided civilian victims the acknowledgment, apology, and reparations they are owed.Twenty years after the US began its secret and unaccountable killings in Yemen, the Biden Administration should, at long last, change towards a rights-respecting course.

Key findings

This report provides detailed information regarding 12 operations carried out by the United States in Yemen between January 2017 and January 2019.At least 38 Yemeni civilians, including 13 children, six women, and 19 men, were killed in these operations. At least seven civilians, including six children, five of whom were under the age of ten, and one man, were injured. Civilians were going about their everyday lives—driving to visit friends, bringing food to their families, sleeping in their homes—when killed or injured.These US operations also caused other forms of deep and long-lasting civilian harm. The incidents led to adverse economic effects, killing primary breadwinners whose families relied on their incomes, and damaging and destroying important civilian property, including vehicles, homes, and livestock. The operations also caused significant social and psychological harm. In a few cases, surviving members of families left their homes following US operations, saying they felt unsafe and worried about future strikes.The 12 incidents in this report include ten airstrikes, all apparently conducted with unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), and two ground raids in five Yemeni governorates—Abyan, Al Bayda, Shabwah, Hadramawt and Ma’rib.In only one of the documented incidents has the US acknowledged any resulting civilian harm.This report raises serious concerns about the extent to which the United States is complying with international law in its use of lethal force in Yemen. It finds that the United States is failing to investigate credible allegations of violations, to hold individuals responsible for violations accountable, and to provide prompt and adequate reparation.

Methodology

Mwatana for Human Rights has documented the civilian impact of the United States’ use of drones and other lethal force in Yemen for nearly a decade.[1] Mwatana’s researchers—women and men dedicated to working towards peace and justice in Yemen—use rigorous and peer-reviewed investigation methods to investigate alleged incidents. They visit strike sites; interview survivors, family members, and witnesses; photograph weapons remnants; collect photographs and videos from relatives and community members; and examine documents that relate to witness accounts, including death certificates, birth certificates, medical reports, government and military statements, and other documents detailing where victims worked and studied, as well as the extent of harm they faced in these incidents.

Context

The voices of the victims of US operations have been largely drowned out by media coverage focused on the broader war in Yemen. There are many armed actors in Yemen, and all sides have committed abuses against civilians. Since the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group took over the country’s capital in 2014 and a coalition of forces led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened in that conflict in 2015, civilians in Yemen have suffered indiscriminate and disproportionate airstrikes and ground shelling, the use of widely-banned weapons such as cluster munitions and landmines, and the widespread use of enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture, among other abuses.[2]The United States has militarily supported Saudi/UAE-led coalition operations, providing intelligence, logistical support, training, and aerial refueling to the coalition at various points since 2015.[3] The United States has also continued to arm Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other coalition members. In a 2018 report, the US government acknowledged that “many of the[] defense articles and defenses services [provided by the United States to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other members of the Coalition] have been used in the conflict in Yemen.”[4] Mwatana has repeatedly documented the use of US-manufactured weapons in indiscriminate and disproportionate coalition airstrikes, some of which may amount to war crimes.[5]In addition to its support to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition, the United States has also carried out direct attacks in Yemen as part of its “counterterrorism” operations.In the name of national security, the Obama Administration dramatically expanded the use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) across the globe, including in Yemen. In 2017, during President Trump’s first year in office, the rate of US air strikes in Yemen soared,[6] and then fell to around the same rate seen in the last years of the Obama Administration.[7] The Trump Administration also authorized ground raids in Yemen, two of which are described in this report and resulted in at least two dozen civilian casualties.[8] Both the US military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have used lethal force in Yemen.In February 2021, the US announced it would cease all support for Saudi/UAE-led coalition offensive operations in Yemen, as well as suspend “relevant” arms sales. US officials said the announcement did not affect US operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP), noting these were “actions that we undertake in service of protecting the homeland and protecting American interests in the region and our allies and partners.”[9]In their approach to “counterterrorism,” successive US Administrations have sought to collapse the distinction between war time and peace time, and the associated international rules on the use of lethal force.[10] The US government has sought to expand the “legal” circumstances under which it can use lethal force internationally, risking damage to long-existing protections of international law. Throughout, civilians have continued to be killed, wounded and otherwise harmed, very often with no acknowledgement, accountability or reparation to speak of.

Civilian harm

Those killed by the US operations described in this report played important roles in their families and their communities. Two of the men killed were teachers. One was described as “beloved” by his students. The other kept teaching even after civil servant salaries in Yemen had stopped.[11] Others killed by US operations included university students, beekeepers, fishermen, drivers, laborers and housewives. People sometimes spoke of the stolen potential when those who were killed were young. A poor family had “high hopes” for their 12-year-old boy, his teacher said. He was a “very very good child” before he was killed in a US strike.[12]Family members described grief at the loss of their loved ones. A grandmother fainted after seeing the body of her 17-year-old grandson.[13] A 40-year-old man collapsed after learning his two brothers had been killed.[14] An adult son gathered his mother’s remains, while a husband rushed to get his pregnant wife to the hospital, watching her die, accompanied by their nine-year-old son.[15] A mother was found dead, clutching her child.[16] Another mother found her 14-year-old son’s body on fire. His father could “not forget [the boy’s] younger sisters screaming at the sight.”[17]US operations take a psychological toll on survivors and on impacted communities.[18] A survivor told Mwatana that, while he had recovered physically, he continued to feel helpless and depressed a year and a half after a US strike injured him and killed his younger cousin.[19] A mother explained how children have continuing anxiety after US attacks, and can be afraid to be alone: “My six-year-old son wanted to go to the bathroom but then returned without going. When I asked him the reason, he said, ‘I don’t want you all to die without me if the drone hits.’”[20] Others drew links between family members’ trauma and the deterioration of their physical health.[21]Yemeni residents, particularly in certain areas of the country, have been forced to live with US strikes and the possibility that these strikes may kill civilians, including themselves or their family members, for many years.[22] People referred to the fear provoked by the persistent buzzing of drones overhead, and one man told Mwatana that he and his neighbors were worried after noticing an unusually heavy presence of drones in the sky. Three days later, in August 2017, a US strike killed a young man and a boy resting under a tree in the afternoon heat. “The drones have a black record of killings,” he said.[23]Certain areas of Yemen have been particularly impacted by US operations. Half of the operations documented in this report took place in the central Yemeni governorate of Al Bayda, and a third in or near Yakla village—a small, isolated mountainous part of Al Bayda governorate that lacks most basic services. People living in areas frequently targeted by US operations said that despite US government claims of drone strikes’ precision, people had grown to expect that drones were likely to strike and otherwise impact civilians, particularly in areas which had an AQAP presence.The US operations described in this report led to significant adverse economic effects for families. In many cases, civilian men killed by US strikes left behind large families that relied on their incomes.[24] A few of the men killed in the incidents described in this report were expatriate workers, and the money they sent home was an important source of income for their families.[25] After a US strike killed a man who had worked painting houses in Saudi Arabia, his family reported struggling to make ends meet.[26]In almost all of the operations included in this report, the US destroyed important civilian property, including vehicles, homes, and livestock.[27] A 2018 US strike destroyed the only vehicle that a displaced family owned. The family had used the vehicle to transport water, food, fuel and other essential goods.[28] Another US strike hit a man’s vehicle while he was transporting food intended to assist some families in a small, mountainous village. The man was killed and the vehicle destroyed.[29] Two men who worked in the honey trade, for which Yemen is famous, owned dozens of beehives. Both men’s families relied on the income from the honey they sold. A US airstrike in 2017 killed the two men, burned most of their beehives, and scattered the rest.[30]In a few cases, families left their homes after US operations, saying they felt unsafe and worried about future strikes.[31] One father, who lost his son in a US strike in Al Bayda in 2017, said he moved his family to another governorate afterwards “to protect the rest of my children.”[32] After two men were killed in a US strike in Abyan in 2017, their families decided to leave the village. A relative asked, “How is it that a drone known for its accuracy targeted people who had no connection to any terrorist group?!”[33] Another US strike in Abyan in 2017 killed another two civilian men. Their families also left their homes. One of the men’s fathers said, “We tried more than once to make our voice heard… asking them [the US] to come and check… but nobody wanted to hear us. I hope that our voices will be heard. We have lost a lot and do not want to lose more.”[34]Witnesses from different parts of Yemen said that the continued civilian harm had caused anger towards the US. In a few cases, local communities organized public protests after attacks.[35] People told Mwatana that continued US strikes on civilians increased their frustration and diminished their sense of safety, and left them with the impression that the US was indifferent toward civilian lives. After a US strike killed two women in Al Bayda, one of whom was pregnant, a relative said, “We, as well as our women and children, have become an easy target for the American drone strikes while the international community stands idly by and nobody seems to care.”[36] And, after a 2019 strike killed a civilian man, family members told Mwatana, “We are desperate in trying to get our voices heard. We are being killed in cold blood.”[37]Witnesses also expressed anger at the Yemeni government for failing to stop these attacks. As one man whose three brothers were killed in a strike said, “Our lives and the lives of our children and women have come to be in constant danger from these repeated wrongful attacks on innocents. If our silence continues, the air strikes will occur repeatedly and continue in this form, particularly with the failure of the Yemeni government [to stop them].”[38]While Yemeni government officials have occasionally criticized US operations, there is no evidence that the government of Yemen has taken meaningful action to protect the lives of its citizens from the impact of US operations. Despite a mounting civilian toll, the US has repeatedly claimed it is conducting these operations with the Yemeni government’s consent. A few months after a US raid killed or injured at least 20 Yemeni civilians, the US carried out another raid in Yemen in May 2017, which the US described as a “Yemen authorized operation.”[39] Mwatana found the second raid killed at least five people, including two civilians and two members of the US-aligned Yemeni army, and wounded another four—two more civilians and two more Yemeni army soldiers.[40]

Law and Policy Concerns

The incidents described in this report raise serious concerns about the extent to which the United States is complying with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, where applicable, in Yemen, particularly regarding precautionary measures, distinction, military necessity, and proportionality.The cases in this report raise concerns about who the US deems targetable, and what precautionary measures the US is taking to protect civilians, including to verify that a person is in fact a lawful target.In the vast majority of strikes documented in this report, the US killed and wounded men and boys, often in areas frequently targeted by US air strikes. While Mwatana found that some of the areas where the US carried out the documented operations had an AQAP presence at the time of the attack or before it, Mwatana also repeatedly found that the individuals the US was killing and wounding were civilians.[41]The US did not acknowledge any civilian casualties in any of the ten air strikes documented in this report.[42] On the contrary, the US claimed it had targeted AQAP or the Islamic State in Yemen (IS-Y), or that it had killed “terrorists.” The civilian men and boys that were killed left behind brothers, sisters, wives, children, siblings and friends.Residents expressed shock at the apparent targets of US strikes. After a strike killed a 45-year-old man in 2017 in Al Bayda, a local resident said, “He is a man who sells and buys food and poultry. He was targeted by an American drone for no reason at all.”[43] After a 2018 strike, a resident said that a child was killed while “returning from the market to his house. That’s it. He went to the market to buy some groceries and was killed on his way. He wasn’t guilty [of anything].”[44]Eight of the 10 documented air strikes were carried out against people traveling in vehicles—cars and motorcycles. In some of these cases, the vehicle belonged to someone else, or had been recently bought or found by those using it at the time of the strike.The report also raises serious concerns regarding the types of people the US is targeting, including whether these people posed any form of threat—imminent or otherwise—to the United States or US persons. In 2018, the US killed a 12-year-old boy and severely wounded his 17-year-old cousin. US Central Command seemed to imply that a child was, or children were, harmed in the strike, noting that “Al Qaeda exploits children,” but claimed the strike “impacted the intended Al Qaeda target with no harm to civilians or civilian objects.”[45] The letter did not explain what, if any, threat a 12-year-old or 17-year-old boy in a remote part of Yemen posed to the United States or to US persons.[46]This strike, as well as others in the report, also raises concerns that the US is killing individuals when it would be feasible to capture them.[47] The 17-year-old boy who was wounded in the strike regularly went to and from a military camp as part of his job. The military camp was under the control of the US-allied Yemeni government. If he was the intended target, why was he killed in a strike rather than arrested at the camp? In other strikes discussed in this report, the US killed or wounded additional members of the US-aligned Yemeni military, or conducted operations in areas within reach of US allies on the ground.[48]The United States is failing to meet its obligation to investigate credible allegations of international law violations, to hold individuals who are responsible for violations accountable, and to provide prompt and adequate reparation.The US has consistently denied and undercounted the number of civilians killed, injured and otherwise harmed in its operations in Yemen. The US government has acknowledged civilian harm resulting from only one of the incidents documented in this report—the January 2017 raid in Al Bayda governorate. Even in this case, the US undercounted the true civilian toll.[49]In statements made in the aftermath of its operations, the United States has repeatedly failed to account for civilian casualties, or mislabeled civilians as lawful targets. After a May 2017 raid in Ma’rib, the US claimed it raided an AQAP “compound,” that there were no civilian casualties, and that the strike killed seven AQAP “militants.”[50] Mwatana visited the small village. The raid had killed at least two civilians, including a 72-year-old former shepherd who could not see or stand properly, and wounded another two civilians, including a young boy. After, the shepherd was found dead, lying next to a small mosque his family had just finished building.[51]As part of Mwatana’s efforts to seek transparency, truth, and accountability, it, together with the Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic, reported in detail the civilian harm documented in this report to the US military.[52] These submissions, totaling more than 150 pages, were delivered in December 2019 and November 2020 to US Central Command. Mwatana and the Clinic made significant efforts to seek a response from the military, including whether they could explain the strikes, and whether they would acknowledge civilian harm and provide reparation, compensation or other amends to civilians affected. US Central Command’s response to the December 2019 submission—in which the US denied any civilian harm—is included as an annex to this report. At the time of writing, the US military had not yet replied to the November 2020 submission.For Yemenis who have been directly affected by US lethal operations, it is nearly impossible to report civilian harm.While surviving relatives called for accountability, including reparations, none of the individuals interviewed for this report knew of any US investigations into civilian harm in Yemen, nor had they been contacted by the United States in regards what had happened to them. None of the civilian victims reported having received compensation, condolence payments or other forms of amends.

Key Recommendations

There are a number of steps the United States should take to re-set towards a rights-respecting approach to Yemen, beginning with conducting more thorough and transparent investigations into claims of civilian harm, and moving all the way through to ensuring the US is abiding with all applicable international law, including that constraining the use of force and protecting the right to life, and ensuring accountability and reparation for violations.After years of reporting, advocacy and litigation by survivors of US attacks and civil society groups, the Obama Administration announced in 2013 a set of policies and procedures meant to guide the United States’ use of lethal force abroad. While these guidelines marginally increased transparency and contained a few important measures, including that there be “near certainty” civilians not be killed or injured in operations taken outside areas of active hostilities, civilians continued to be harmed in US operations abroad. Put in place by the then-president, executive branch power to determine when, if and how lethal force was used across the globe remained expansive and entrenched. After his inauguration in 2017, President Trump’s administration began to change some of these policies and procedures, including reportedly loosening restraints related to targeting policy and reporting.While the US eventually began to acknowledge certain strikes and operations, transparency remains woefully lacking. The US Department of Defense has acknowledged carrying out lethal operations in Yemen, and in some cases provides the date, governorate and intended target or objective of operations. It has very rarely acknowledged civilian deaths caused by the United States in Yemen, and its disclosures on civilian harm beyond deaths are minimal to non-existent. The CIA does not even acknowledge the lethal operations it carries out.To ensure a full and meaningful transformation of US policy on Yemen that protects the right to life, including Yemenis’ right to life, the US should conduct a full review regarding the impact of its operations in Yemen. This review should examine the lawfulness and civilian impact of each operation undertaken since the United States began using lethal force in Yemen nearly two decades ago, and take a hard look at whether these operations have been at all effective in making anyone safer. After this review, the US should acknowledge each instance of civilian harm and the wider impact on the communities subjected to these operations, work to provide reparations, condolence payments, and other forms of amends, and ensure accountability where required.Acknowledgment of civilian harm, paired with reparations and accountability, can go a long way towards disrupting cycles of violence. For years, the US has contributed to fueling and furthering conflict in Yemen. It is entirely possible to change course. If the Biden Administration were to adopt the recommendations outlined in this report, it would constitute a significant step towards transforming the United States’ relationship to Yemen. In the end, the best approach the US can take towards Yemen is beginning to listen, heed and support the many Yemenis already working to build a country that centers rights respect, peace and justice.

Recommendations

To the United States

  • Abide by all applicable international law requirements, including those that constrain the use of force and protect the right to life.
  • Adhere to the rule that, in the context of armed conflict, where there is doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person must be considered a civilian.
  • Conduct a full review regarding the impact of US operations in Yemen, including an examination of the lawfulness and civilian impact of each US operation undertaken since the US began using lethal force in Yemen nearly two decades ago. Assessments of the lawfulness of operations should consider all applicable international law requirements, including those that constrain the use of force and protect the right to life.
  • Robustly investigate all credible reports and allegations of unlawful civilian harm associated with the United States’ use of lethal force in Yemen, including those documented in this report, as well as where US forces participated in others’ unlawful attacks. Carefully consider external sources, including reports by civil society, witnesses, family members and survivors, prosecute and impose disciplinary actions and other penalties where appropriate, and publicly disclose the results.
  • Implement an effective and accessible process for survivors, family members and civil society, including local civil society, to submit claims, information and evidence regarding civilian harm resulting from the United States’ use of lethal force in Yemen. Provide clear, accessible and up-to-date information, including in Arabic, regarding how to submit information, as well as on any alleged violations found, any investigations and prosecutions undertaken, and any remedies provided. Ensure appropriate resources, including staff, are dedicated to these efforts.
  • Acknowledge each instance of the United States’ use of lethal force in Yemen, including those undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency, and include the number of people killed and wounded, broken down by location, date, age, and gender, the number categorized by the US as “civilians” and “combatants,” and the criteria used to determine such statuses.
  • Apologize to survivors and victims’ families for civilian harm caused by the United States in Yemen.
  • Provide prompt and meaningful reparations, condolence payments and other forms of amends, as appropriate, to civilians harmed by the United States in Yemen.
  • Publicly disclose the guidelines, policies and legal frameworks the US is applying to its operations in Yemen, including those targeting AQAP and IS-Y and whether and when parts of Yemen have been designated areas of active hostilities. Disclose civilian harm mitigation procedures and all guidance on standards for investigations, including deeming civilian casualty reports credible.
  • Cooperate with investigations, including those conducted by the UN Group of Eminent Experts and relevant UN special procedures mandate holders, into all credible reports and allegations of unlawful civilian harm associated with the United States’ use of lethal force in Yemen, including those documented in this report.

To Yemen

  • Condition consent for US action in Yemen on the United States’ compliance with all applicable international law requirements, including those that constrain the use of force and protect the right to life, and on the US implementing the above recommendations, including to undertake effective investigations, provide credible reparation and ensure accountability.
  • Where the government consents to the United States’ use of force in Yemen, do so openly and clearly, and state any conditions attached to this consent.
  • Publicly disclose the type and magnitude of cooperation with the United States and any other relevant government in operations against AQAP and IS-Y, and the role Yemen has and currently plays in these operations, including which Yemeni government agencies and institutions are involved.
  • Publicly disclose any agreements between the Yemeni government and the United States, as well as between the Yemeni government and other governments, regarding the use of lethal force in Yemen and relating to the status of foreign forces in Yemen.
  • In cases where Yemeni forces have been credibly implicated in international law violations, including international crimes, prosecute and impose disciplinary actions and other penalties where appropriate.
  • Support efforts towards credible transitional justice, including during the peace process, and including supporting a means for seeking truth regarding those killed and wounded by the United States’ use of lethal force in Yemen, and memorializing civilian victims.
  • Raise specific cases of civilian harm with the US government, including those documented in this report, and advocate for accountability and prompt and meaningful reparations, condolence payments, and other forms of amends for civilians harmed.
  • Cooperate with investigations, including those conducted by the UN Group of Eminent Experts and relevant UN special procedures mandate holders, into all credible reports and allegations of unlawful civilian harm in Yemen, including those associated with the United States’ use of lethal force in Yemen, including those documented in this report.
  • Extend an invitation to relevant UN entities, including the UN Group of Eminent Experts and UN special procedures mandate holders, including the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, to visit Yemen, and cooperate with these entities.

To the UN Eminent International and Regional Experts Group on Yemen

  • Continue investigating the United States’ use of lethal force in Yemen and preserve the information from these investigations for future use, including efforts towards accountability and reparation.

[1]See, e.g., Death by Drone: Civilian Harm Caused by US Targeted Killings in Yemen, Open Society Justice Initiative & Mwatana for Human Rights (April 2015), http://mwatana.org/en/death-by-drones/.[2]See, e.g., Chapters from Hell: Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Armed Ground Conflict in Taiz, Mwatana for Human Rights (November 6, 2016), https://mwatana.org/en/chapters-from-hell/; Press in Yemen Faces Extinction: Journalists Need Support, Mwatana for Human Rights (June 23, 2017), https://mwatana.org/en/press-in-yemen-faces-extinction/; Day of Judgment: Role of the US and Europe in Civilian Death, Destruction and Trauma in Yemen, Mwatana for Human Rights, PAX, and the University Network for Human Rights (March 6, 2019), https://mwatana.org/en/day-of-judgment/; Concealed Killer: Fall of civilians by the landmines laid by the Ansar Allah Armed Group (the Houthis) and Saleh Forces, Mwatana for Human Rights (April 2017), https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Concealed-Killer-Report-En.pdf.[3] The United States' military support to the Saudi/UAE-led coalition in their ongoing military operations is examined in more detail in other Mwatana publications. See, e.g., Day of Judgment, supra note 2; In the Darkness: Abusive Detention, Disappearance and Torture in Yemen’s Unofficial Prisons, Mwatana for Human Rights (June 2020), https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/In-the-Darkness.pdf.[4]2018Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States' Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations, The White House (October 2019) at p. 6, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Report-to-Congress-on-legal-and-policy-frameworks-guiding-use-of-military-force-.pdf.[5] “Day of Judgment,” supra note 2 at p. 15.[6] The US launched an estimated 127 airstrikes in Yemen in 2017. “US Strikes in Yemen, 2002 to Present,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lb1hEYJ_omI8lSe33izwS2a2lbiygs0hTp2Al_Kz5KQ/edit#gid=323032473.[7] The US conducted about three dozen airstrikes in 2018, which is comparable to the number carried out in 2015 and 2016 (23 and 44, respectively). “US Airstrikes in the Long War,” The Long War Journal, https://www.longwarjournal.org/us-airstrikes-in-the-long-war; “Yemen: Reported US covert actions 2018,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2018; “Reported US covert actions 2019,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2019.[8]See Section IV, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib; Section IV, Civilian Harm from January 29, 2017 Raid on Al Bayda, Yemen.[9] Rebecca Kheel, “Biden announces end to US support for offensive operations in Yemen,” The Hill (February 4, 2021), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/537346-biden-to-announce-end-to-us-support-for-offensive-operations-in-yemen.[10]See, e.g., The Late Show with Stephen Colbert,President Obama Reflects On The Drone Program And "The Illusion That It Is Not War,” YouTube (December 1, 2020). But note the established international legal framework for the use of force—international human rights law, international humanitarian law and inter-State force—provides the correct framework.[11]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 26/27, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 4, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen.[12]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 5, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen.[13]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 25, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen.[14]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 26/27, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen.[15]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from December 14 or 15, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[16]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 29, 2017 Raid on Al Bayda, Yemen.[17]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from November 23, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[18]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 21 or 22, 2019 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 5, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 29, 2017 Raid on Al Bayda, Yemen.[19]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 5, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen.[20]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen.[21]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 21 or 22, 2019 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[22]See, e.g. Abdulrasheed Al-Faqih, “Civilian Casualties and Effectiveness of US Drone Strikes in Yemen,” Just Security (April 3, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54464/civilian-casualties-effectiveness-u-s-drone-strikes-yemen-part/; Abdulrasheed Al-Faqih and Kristine Beckerle, “US Fails to Acknowledge Killing Yemeni Civilians,” Just Security (May 15, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/70151/u-s-fails-to-acknowledge-killing-yemeni-civilians/; Death by Drone, supra note 1; Section VI, Civilian Harm from August 13, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from December 14 or 15, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 5, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 29, 2018 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 25, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen.[23]See Section VI, civilian harm from August 13, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen.[24]See, Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 21 or 22, 2019 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 29, 2018 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from December 22, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from November 23, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from August 13, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 4, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen.[25]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from November 23, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 21 or 22, 2019 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 29, 2018 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[26]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from November 23, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[27]See, Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 21 or 22, 2019 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 25, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 5, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 26/27, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from December 22, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from December 14 or 15, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from November 23, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from August 13, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 4, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 29, 2017 Raid on Al Bayda, Yemen.[28]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 5, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen.[29]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from December 22, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[30]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from August 13, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen.[31]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 4, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from November 23, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from August 13, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen.[32]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 29, 2018 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[33]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from August 13, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen.[34]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 29, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda Yemen.[35]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 21 or 22, 2019 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 26/27, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen.[36]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from December 14 or 15, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[37]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 21or 22, 2019 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[38]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 8, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen.[39]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen.[40]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen.[41]See Section III, “Methodology” on how Mwatana chooses to investigate strikes, and how Mwatana classifies individuals as civilians.[42] The January 2017 raid in Al Bayda is the only incident documented in this report where the US directly acknowledged resulting civilian harm. The US did not acknowledge any resulting civilian harm from any of the ten air strikes included in this report.[43]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from December 22, 2017 Air Strike on Al Bayda, Yemen.[44]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 25, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen.[45]See Annex B., “Response Letter from the US Department of Defense to Mwatana for Human Rights and Columbia Law School’s Human Rights Clinic” (March 18, 2020).[46]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 5, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen.[47]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 5, 2018 Air Strike on Hadramawt, Yemen.[48]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 26/27, 2018 Air Strike on Shabwah, Yemen; Section VI, Civilian Harm from March 4, 2017 Air Strike on Abyan, Yemen.[49]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from January 29, 2017 Raid on Al Bayda, Yemen.[50]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen.[51]See Section VI, Civilian Harm from May 23, 2017 Raid on Marib, Yemen.[52]See Annexes.[/fusion_text][/fusion_builder_column][/fusion_builder_row][/fusion_builder_container]